By 1970, a new framework had begun to emerge with which to understand both memory storage and memory loss. During this period, a number of independent laboratories had demonstrated that both experimentally induced and naturally occurring instances of ''memory failure'' could be reversed by exposing amnestic subjects to isolated aspects of the training conditions upon which the forgotten memory had been based (Campbell and Jaynes 1966; Lewis et al. 1968; Miller and Springer 1972) . While these data suggested a nominally novel interpretation of memory ''loss'' (better described as a ''lapse'' in these cases), they were, in some respect, a reassertion of what had long been known: Seemingly forgotten memories are often recovered. Colloquially, what is forgotten is not necessarily gone. To experience this effect outside of the laboratory, one need only look up a long ''forgotten'' phone number. The phone number will be instantly recognizable and easily relearned, indicative of the intact storage of a memory that seems, superficially, to have been ''lost.'' Empirical observations from the 1960s led many to conclude that experimentally induced amnesia, as well as naturally occurring memory loss, might reflect instances of retrieval rather than storage failure (Lewis 1969; Spear 1978) . Despite the compelling nature of the experimental results and the fundamental significance of the theory that they encouraged, available data have left unresolved this long-standing controversy, and this conundrum may have limited the acceptance of ''retrieval theory'' by the larger field of memory researchers. In their recent paper, Hardt et al. (2009) correctly identify this enduring stalemate, arguing that prevailing methodologies have left unanswered the most basic of questions, i.e., does experimental amnesia reflect a memory loss or a retrieval failure? As Hardt et al. note, if an instance of memory failure seems immune to recovery, it cannot be said with certainty whether the memory is actually absent or simply that the retrieval blockade is too strong to be overcome with the applied technique (e.g., a specific ''retrieval cue''). On the other hand, the recovery of a seemingly lost memory could simply reflect an intact, but subthreshold (or degraded), memory being nudged across some previously unreached threshold for activation. Hardt et al. argue that a true test of the opposing views would require a test in which retrieval and storage interpretations of memory failure make opposite predictions regarding a tangible result (i.e., a result that is not dependent on the observation of a null effect). It is that approach that Hardt et al. (2009) take in their recent paper in Learning & Memory.
Hart et al.'s approach to this problem is a welcome point of departure from prior efforts, and brings forth a strategy and techniques that were not available when this vein of research was originally struck. It has been previously observed that contextual fear conditioning (in which a context, or place, comes to evoke fear owing to its association with foot shock) is dependent on plasticity within the dorsal hippocampus, and that this plasticity requires the participation of N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptors. However, it has also been established that this requirement for NMDA receptors subsides after the first training trial, such that NMDA receptor antagonists (such as 2-amino-5-phosphonopentanoic acid; AP5) block learning on the first conditioning event, but not on subsequent exposures to the context paired with shock (Sanders and Fanselow 2003) . Hardt et al. exploit this observation for the present purpose. They argue that if inducing experimental amnesia (through the post-training administration of the protein synthesis inhibitor anisomycin; ANI) impairs memory storage after the first training event, then no residual memory will persist into the second training event, and consequently an NMDA receptor antagonist (e.g., AP5) should effectively block learning on the second event, as though prior learning had never occurred. In contrast, if ANI disrupts retrieval of the memory effectively stored after the first training event, then the memory of that event will remain intact into the second training event, and therefore AP5 should be ineffective in blocking learning during the second event; that is, learning in the presence of AP5 during the second training would suggest that a memory of the first training event had survived the amnesic effects of ANI. When these predictions were tested, Hardt et al. find that AP5 impairs learning of the second training event despite ANI having been infused into the dorsal hippocampus after the first training event. This led them to conclude that ANI-induced experimental amnesia impairs memory via its impact on the storage, not retrieval, of the previously coded memory.
Despite the virtues of their approach, the results of Hardt et al. are not immune from alternative interpretations, and in fact, introduce a new set of complications akin to those that have plagued prior efforts to parse storage failures from retrieval failures in experimental amnesia. First is the issue raised by the assumption that contextual fear memories reside exclusively in the dorsal hippocampus (dHPC). While it is clear that the dHPC plays a critical role in the mediation of contextually mediated learning, available data suggest that the HPC is not the sole storage site of nominally context-based memories (Good and Honey 1991; Good et al. 2007) . Of course it is also possible that learned fear responses may depend intimately on the integrity of the HPC, while actual storage (or some component of the stored memory) may reside in other brain structures (Berger et al. 1976 (Berger et al. , 1980 Talk et al. 2002) . It is indisputable that exactly these types of considerations have complicated any definitive statement regarding the function of the HPC in memory storage. If one accepts even the remote possibility that contextual fear memories reside (even to a functionally trivial degree) in some brain areas in addition to the dHPC, then the dHPC-limited ANI injections administered by Hardt et al. will have left those residual memory traces intact. Were such the case, then those residual memories would have been available to the animal on Hardt et al.'s second training event, and consequently, should have been immune to the AP5 treatment. Why then were Hardt et al.'s animals vulnerable to the localized effects of AP5 during the second training event (i.e., after the induction of ANI-induced amnesia for the first training event)? One can only speculate, but given the complex, if not conflicting, assumptions that must be met to accept Hardt et al.'s interpretation of these results, it is worth considering a more parsimonious alternative to their account. It is reasonable to ask an as yet unanswered question: Does the vulnerability of the second training event to AP5 depend on the memory of the first training trial having been lost, or on the failure of the memory of the first training event to be retrieved? If the vulnerability of the second training event to AP5 depends on the retrievability of the original memory, then Hardt et al.'s observations would be entirely explicable in terms of ANI having induced a retrieval failure. Hardt et al.'s preferred interpretation of these effects presupposes that the basis for ANI-induced amnesia is known, when in fact these very experiments were intended to determine the basis of this effect. These complications are precisely analogous to the one asserted by Hardt et al. to have plagued previous efforts to distinguish storage from retrieval interpretations of experimentally induced amnesia.
Related to the above issue is the effectiveness of ANI itself. When employed as an amnestic agent, the impact of ANI on protein synthesis inhibition is often reported as an indicator of the effectiveness of the drug. Such an analysis is absent from the report by Hardt et al. ( It is noted that the procedures used by these authors are well established, and their previously demonstrated expertise in these areas instill complete confidence in the effectiveness of their ANI treatment.) However, a brief review of the previous literature suggests that, independent of the route of administration, concentrations of ANI comparable to those employed by Hardt et al. produce less than complete inhibition of new protein synthesis (typically ranging from 70% to 90%) (Milekic et al. 2006; Languille et al. 2008 ). This incomplete inhibition of protein synthesis is unavoidable, as higher concentrations of the drug often promote adverse/nonspecific consequences. We are then left to ask how such an amnestic agent could ever be complete, and if not, what the consequences might be for interpretation of the recovery from experimentally induced amnesia.
Hardt et al. have utilized a creative and novel approach in an effort to resolve an enduring controversy, i.e., to separate the effects of experimentally induced amnesia on retrieval processes from its impact on memory storage. Behavioral neuroscience has undergone a rapid evolution during the past two decades. Since this line of inquiry initially began in the 1960s, it is now possible to specify (with some precision) neuroanatomical storage sites for process-limited memories. Moreover, we now have technical capabilities that permit neuroanatomically specific administration (via microinjection) of both amnestic agents and modulators of neuronal plasticity. While these advances have promoted new knowledge and advances in our discipline, they also introduce new complications, like those described above. Thus, for the present purposes, old strategies may be more appropriate. For instance, it was noted above that localized administration of the amnestic agent ANI is confounded by potentially distributed memory storage and the incomplete effectiveness of ANI as an inhibitor of protein synthesis. While for most purposes, systemic administration of ANI would be avoided, in the present case, brain-wide inhibition of protein synthesis (and its impact on illdefined secondary storage sites) might be advantageous. Such a strategy does not, however, mitigate the incomplete action of ANI as an inhibitor of new protein synthesis. To this end, electroconvulsive shock (ECS) has often been employed for the specific purpose of promoting widespread and ostensibly ''complete'' amnesia (Barnes et al. 1994) . Because it does not differentiate brain structures and induces a complex disruption of synaptic transmission regardless of transmitter system or receptor subtype, ECS would normally be shunned as a tool for modern neuroscientific inquires. Exactly because of these properties, ECS as an amnestic agent might be preferable to the localized and sitelimited approach favored by Hardt et al.
In summary, Hardt et al. have made a serious effort to address an issue that has heretofore proven intractable, and further work in this vein will surely provide a more complete and better understanding of the nature of experimental amnesia. In the end, it is entirely possible that amnestic treatments might under some (or even many) conditions disrupt the storage of recently acquired memories. Under other circumstances, it is possible that seemingly lost memories may reflect a failure of the retrieval process. Perhaps, more important is the very nature of this debate. A question that might better be asked is under what circumstances do each of these interacting influences prevail, and what might be the functional consequences for memory processing?
